3 permanent residence status. 4 Civic integration abroad takes the fusion of migration control and immigrant integration to a whole new level, by making entry rights conditional on participation in or successful completion of the programs.
In France as in the Netherlands, the introduction of civic integration abroad was a response to a growing concern for the societal consequences of past and present migration flows. Both French and Dutch politicians perceived the process of migrant incorporation as failing, to the extent that the cohesion of society as a whole was endangered and that state intervention was necessary to restore the minimum conditions for society to function harmoniously.
However, while French and Dutch politicians defined the 'problem' they were confronted with in very similar terms, the modalities of the civic integration abroad policies implemented to solve this problem are significantly different. In the Netherlands, family migrants are required to pass a test. The government provides neither courses nor learning material. In France, in contrast, applicants are obliged to participate in the program, not to achieve certain results. Courses are organised by the government, free of charge for the applicant. In other words, the Dutch civic integration abroad program is much more restrictive than the French.
This begs the question: how can we explain that in France and in the Netherlands, political discourses about the 'problem' of immigration, integration and social cohesion that were much alike resulted in civic integration abroad policies that are strikingly different?
To plenary debates about these proposals in both Chambers of Parliament. 5 Starting from a constructivist approach to the study of policy-making 6 I investigated how Dutch and French politicians framed the 'problem' of immigration, integration and social cohesion, and how the civic integration abroad policies they designed were intended to contribute to solving this 'problem'. The first section of this paper presents the findings of this analysis. In the second half of the paper, I discuss two hypothetical explanations for the difference between the Dutch and the French programs. The first explanation pertains to party politics, that is to the positions adopted by the parliamentary parties and the relations between them; the second to the judicial constraints that weigh upon family migration policies in
France and the Netherlands. the formation of ghettos, the juxtaposition of antagonist blocs". 7 In the Netherlands, the first Balkenende government described the situation as follows:
Same 'problem', different solution: the making of French and Dutch civic integration abroad policies

The 'problem' of immigration, integration and social cohesion
Differences in ethnic origin, ways of life and habits are placing a burden on daily contacts and on residing, working and living side by side. Moreover, differences in ethnic origin increasingly correlate with differences in education, labour participation and involvement in criminality. It triggers centrifugal forces in society and leads to the physical, social and mental separation of population groups. Isolation leads to misunderstanding, then to mutual repugnance and finally to ever sharper oppositions. The 'problem' then, is perceived to affect society as a whole: ethnic and cultural diversity presents a threat to the very cohesion of society.
More specifically, this 'problem' of social cohesion is defined as a problem of migrant groups.
French and Dutch politicians are worried that migrants are oriented towards their own group, culture and identity, rather than to society as a whole. The French government describes this phenomenon as "communautarisme", which consists of a "repli", i.e. a "drawing back" and which results in "fear of the other", in "indifference, violence and refusal of the other". 9 The Dutch government mirrors these views closely, in stating that "the marginalisation of certain groups of the population" increases the risk of "turning away from society, anti-western feelings, segregation and delinquency". 10 Migrants are considered both the actor and the victim of the 'problem'. On the one hand, they are the ones who are allegedly "pulling back into their community"
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, "turning away from society and reverting to archaic norms and values". 12 On the other hand, they are seen to be the ones to suffer from "marginalisation" and "isolation" 13 , from being "locked up in communautarist schemes". 14 When speaking about migrants as victims, Dutch and French politicians refer primarily to women of migrant origin: to their perceived exclusion, dependency and vulnerability, and to the suppression and violence they are thought to be subjected to within their families and communities.
In politicians' perception of the 'problem' of migration, integration and social cohesion, both socio-economic and cultural aspects play a role. Indeed, it is precisely the idea that socio-economic disadvantage in the fields of labour, education and housing overlaps with ethnic and cultural difference, that socio-economic gaps and cultural cleavages are mutually reinforcing each other, which is cause for concern. When specifying the differences in values and customs they find problematic, politicians in France and the Netherlands refer first to matters related to gender, family and sexualityforced marriages, domestic violence, child rearing, polygamy and, in the Netherlands, homosexuality -and second to issues regarding religion and church-state relations. It is in these respects that groups of migrant origin -and more particularly, though rarely explicitly mentioned, of Muslim faith -are deemed most worrisomely different from the host society.
The solution: civic integration abroad
As a partial solution to a 'problem' of social cohesion defined in very similar terms, French and Dutch politicians have chosen to introduce civic integration abroad programs. Both programs require family migrants to familiarize themselves with the language and customs of the host country, before being granted admission. The specific modalities of the French and Dutch programs are crucially different however: this difference is related to the objectives pursued through civic integration abroad.
The French civic integration abroad policy, entered into force on 1 January 2008, stipulates that family migrants' knowledge of the "language and values of the Republic" will be evaluated before they are granted entry to France. Both written and oral knowledge of the French language at a very modest level is evaluated in an individual interview which takes no more than twenty minutes. The 7
knowledge of Republican values is tested orally through a ten minutes interview in a language that the foreigner understands. These values are defined as "in particular, equality between men and women, laïcité, the rule of law, the fundamental freedoms, the security of persons and property, as well as the exercise of citizenship that is permitted notably through obligatory and free education". the integration requirement would work as a "selection mechanism": only those with the "motivation and perseverance" necessary to integrate successfully in the Netherlands would be admitted.
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It is in this explicit selective purpose that the Dutch civic integration abroad policy differs most crucially from the French. Civic integration abroad is, by its very nature, a tool aimed both at improving integration and at selecting immigration. These two aspects are balanced differently however in the two countries studied here: integration weighs heavier in France, while selection is more prominent in the Netherlands.
Many have questioned whether the French civic integration abroad program indeed aims at improving integration. As we shall see below, if French left-wing politicians criticised the program, it was because they thought its purpose was predominantly if not exclusively to reduce immigration.
Similar views have been expressed by academic observers. 24 In part, these observations are accurate.
Indeed, the French government implicitly acknowledged that civic integration abroad is a selection tool, in stating that it aims to "reward the efforts of those who really wish to integrate", while denying entry to those who "refuse to take the test and follow the course". 25 Moreover, as left-wing politicians and academics have rightly pointed out, the law which introduced civic integration abroad was explicitly framed by the French government as part of president Sarkozy's overall strategy to limit l'immigration subie -i.e. family migration -in favour of immigration choisie -i.e. labour migration. sharpening of the income requirement was discussed -but under the heading of "favouring integration". 27 In the debates about civic integration abroad, UMP rapporteur Mariani explicitly stated that "our objective is not to limit family reunification" 28 and the French government emphatically presented the evaluation and courses abroad as a service offered to family migrants by the state, as an "additional means given to strangers who wish to settle in France to prepare their integration". 29 The modalities of French civic integration abroad policies show that this was more than hollow rhetoric.
Not only did the French government set a lower barrier for entry than the Dutch, with an obligation of means instead of result; it also put the means to fulfil the entry criterion at the disposal of the applicants, by offering courses for free. In comparison to the Dutch program, the balance between improving integration and restricting immigration in the French civic integration abroad policy leans clearly towards integration, not only in governmental discourse but also in the material policy provisions.
The Dutch government on the other hand elaborated at length on the problematic nature of family migration. It stated that "the large scale immigration of the last ten years has seriously disrupted the integration of migrants at group level. We must break out of the process of (family) migration which time and again causes integration to fall behind". In particular, the integration process was thought to have been "held back by the fact that a large number of second generation migrants opts for a marital partner from the country of origin". According to the government, "an important part of these [family migrants] has characteristics that are adverse to a good integration into Dutch society.
Most prominent among these -also in scale -is the group of marriage migrants from Turkey and Morocco". 30 Both in terms of their chances on the labour market and of their cultural orientation, these family migrants were deemed unlikely to fit into Dutch society. 27 Therefore the Dutch government, unlike the French government, explicitly presented its civic integration abroad criterion as a "selection mechanism". The criterion would select not on education, income or origin -this would infringe on the right to family life guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights -but on "motivation and perseverance". Since the government would not assist applicants in preparing for the exam, a substantial investment of time and resources would be required on their part. This was deemed not only acceptable but even recommendable, because appealing to the "personal responsibility" of the persons concerned would "yield the best results".
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Moreover, "the foreigner might also face difficulties in the integration process after arrival in the Netherlands, which it will be up to him to overcome". 32 Those unable to attain the required level of knowledge through their own means while abroad were expected to "experience serious problems integrating once in the Netherlands" and would therefore "not be granted permission to settle in the Netherlands". Although reduction of immigration was "not a primary goal" 33 , as a "side-effect", the new integration requirement was expected to result in a decrease of family migration flows by an estimated 25%. 34 The government welcomed this prospect: "A reduction of the inflow of migrants whose integration in the Netherlands can be expected to lag behind will alleviate the problem of integration".
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Thus, the balance between integration and selection is crucially different in the French and Dutch civic integration abroad policies. While the Dutch program is explicitly intended to assuage the 'problem' of social cohesion by reducing the inflow of 'problematic' migrants, the emphasis in the French program lies on putting new means at migrants' disposal to improve their integration. Since
French and Dutch politicians defined the 'problem' of migration, integration and social cohesion in such similar terms, and since the French governmental majority's stated overall objective was to limit family migration, described as immigration subie, the question is: how can we explain this difference? they push immigrants to "renounce their own identity(ies) and differences", so as to "disappear into the presumed unity of the nation". 41 The assimilatory pressure exercised by the Dutch program, with its obligation of result, is much more compelling than the French requirement to participate.
The inadequacy of the classic 'national models' explanation makes the question all the more puzzling: how can we explain that, based on a highly similar definition of the social problems resulting from migration and integration, the 'multicultural' Netherlands adopted a much more restrictive civic integration abroad policy than 'assimilationist' France?
Party politics
Another type of explanation for tendencies in and differences between national migration policies to be found in the academic literature -though somewhat less well-established than the 'national models'
hypothesis -centres on the positions adopted by political parties and the (power) relations between them. 42 This approach seems promising in explaining the disparity between the Dutch and the French civic integration programs. consequences for the migrants themselves, for their partners and children, and for society at large.
Thus the Social Democrats concur that "marriage migration (…) may lead to a serious delay in integration", and the far-Left Socialist Party agrees that the choice of second and third generation migrants for a partner from their parents' country of origin contains the "risk of a recurring reproduction of marginalisation from generation to generation". 43 Almost all political parties were in favour of making the admission of family members conditional on integration requirements and of shaping this requirement as an obligation of result, not just of participation. Only the Greens objected, first because they thought a language could much more effectively be learned in the country where it was commonly spoken and second because they considered it unacceptable that "the reduction of the freedom of choice due to family pressure" be "replaced by a reduction of the freedom of partner choice by the government". 44 Again except for the Greens, all parties accepted that the integration abroad requirement would make family migration impossible for a substantial number of candidates, and no-one insisted that the government provide applicants with courses or learning material. The
Social Democrats felt that, since applicants made a voluntary choice to move to the Netherlands, it was legitimate to ask them to make efforts to prepare their integration. 45 Together with the orthodoxChristian party SGP, they did file a motion however to ask the government to make sure that "adequate learning material" would be available and accessible. 46 Their objective was not so much for the government to produce the material, as to supervise its availability and quality. Thus a Socialists deputy stated that the requirement had "no other purpose than to deny the right to family reunification to as many people as possible" through an "accumulation of unfounded administrative harassments". 48 The Left feared that the criterion would be especially difficult to fulfil for women and for poor and less educated foreigners. Second, both the Socialists and the parliamentarians on their Left blamed the government and the UMP for exploiting the issue for electoral gain. Thus the Socialist deputy Lesterlin:
the (…) message that you are charged to convey, in this extraordinary session so conveniently opened six months before the municipal elections, is addressed (…) to a popular electorate, to whom you are saying: "Rest assured; we will get rid of those women in boubou for you, and of those ill-bred kids hanging around in your neighbourhoods". 49 The Greens stated that the government was "trying to have people believe that immigration presents a danger. (…) In truth, you produce this scare-crow to make people forget the infamies of your government". 50 The fact that the courses would be offered to applicants for free could not mollify the French opposition. The Socialists declared that rather than speaking of the "beneficiaries" of the integration program, they would speak of its "victims" and demanded that the program not be 47 presented as a "privilege" but as the "additional condition for the deliverance of a visa" that it really was. 51 The far-Left emphasised that integration was "a duty of the country towards foreigners" and filed an amendment to the effect of the state covering all costs -including transport and lodging -an applicant would have to make to participate in the evaluation and the course. 52 In the Assemblée Nationale as well as in the Senate, the left-wing opposition defended amendments eliminating the two articles about civic integration abroad from the legislative proposal and eventually voted against the law unanimously.
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The much broader political support for civic integration abroad in the Netherlands than in
France may explain at least in part why the Dutch program is significantly more stringent than the 
Judicial constraints
In a report about integration policies in Europe presented in December 2006, UMP-deputy Mariani had proposed that France draw inspiration from the practice of the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, and introduce an "integration test abroad" for family migrants. 59 In a speech he delivered on 5 March 2007 in Marseille, Nicolas Sarkozy, then candidate for the presidential elections, adopted this idea, stating that he wanted to introduce a requirement of integration abroad after the Dutch example, so that "applicants for family reunification will be subjected, in our consulates, to a 'test'
demonstrating their basic knowledge of the French language". 60 Clearly then, the right-wing majority in France originally intended to shape civic integration abroad as an obligation of result, instead of an obligation of means. However, by the time the government submitted its legislative proposal to Parliament, the test had been replaced by an obligation to participate in an evaluation and course.
According to media reports, a "person closely involved" stated that the government had refrained from imposing a test to prevent any risk of being condemned by the Constitutional Council or by the European court.
61
In a similar vein, during the legislative debates, members of the governmental majority in the Assemblée Nationale presented a number of amendments that would have made the French civic integration abroad policy much more similar to the Dutch. Two UMP deputies proposed that admission be made conditional on passing a test, rather than on merely participating in the evaluation and the course. 62 Two other amendments were submitted by the UMP to the effect of charging applicants for the costs of the evaluation and course, possibly to be refunded after satisfactory participation. 63 The government however advised against the adoption of these amendments, because "the Constitutional Council would most certainly censor a provision that would thus infringe upon the right to family reunification". For the same reason, UMP rapporteur Mariani also emitted a negative advice, but he expressed his regrets at having to do so, especially where the financial contribution was concerned. He declared that "once again, it appears that if we want to push further on this subject, a constitutional reform will be necessary". All four amendments were withdrawn, but not before the deputies had made the government promise to come back to their proposals in future debates. 
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This interpretation is in line with the well-established argument that the courts' defence of individual migrants' rights is among the primary reasons why "liberal states accept unwanted migration", as Joppke put it. 76 More specifically, it appears to corroborate Joppke's thesis that governments' room for manoeuvre is limited primarily by individual rights stemming from domestic legal sources 77 and not, as Soysal or Sassen would have it, by international legal norms. 78 It is questionable however, whether it is the type of norm which is invoked -domestic or internationalthat determines the impact of the judiciary on policy-making, or rather the type of legal system in which legal norms are invoked. Guiraudon has shown that the Dutch courts have played a less important role in the extension of rights to migrants over recent decades than their German and French counterparts. 79 Bonjour has recently confirmed that the Dutch judiciary has until now granted substantial leeway to the government to impose conditions upon family migration, thus exerting a much less constraining influence on policy development than the one ascribed to the courts in Furthermore, governmental majorities may feel emboldened to seek the limits of what judicial norms will allow, at the risk of crossing these limits, when their reform proposals enjoy broad political support. In this sense, the Dutch government's position was strong, which is reflected in the confidence with which it consciously opted for a course which was not unlikely to lead to a confrontation with the courts. In contrast, the French government, defending a proposal which was politically controversial, chose a much more prudent approach, steering clear of judicial grey areas.
Thus, this comparative case study shows the value of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of migration policies, combining the insights of law and political sciences: it is the interplay between party politics and judicial constraints that has shaped the making of French and Dutch policies of civic integration abroad.
